Date: Mon, 10 May 1999 16:50:01 From: "Robert L. Nuckolls, III" Subject: COZY: Re: Amateur-Built Accidents At 02:00 PM 3/21/99 CST, you wrote: >"According to NTSB, amateur-built airplanes fly less than two percent >of the hours yet have ten percent of the accidents. Further, >amateur-built airplanes involved in accidents are destroyed 54 >percent more often than manufactured aircraft and their pilots are >killed 88 percent more often"... > >Assuming the facts are as stated, why do you suppose >it is so?? > I am suspicious of this pronouncement . . . at OSH two years ago, acting administrator Valentine stood on the stage at the "Meet the Administrator Meeting" Sunday morning and spoke as follows: "Amateur built accident rates are on a par with certified aircraft. Keep up the good work and we'll stay out of your hair." I recall viewing this as both a compliment and a threat. We could be proud of our accident record but be on notice that there are folk within the FAA that would dearly love to expand their "helpfulness" into the amateur built world. Given that I personally witness that statement and given its source, I would REALLY like to see the NTSB pronouncement over somebody's signature . . . it wouldn't hurt to have access to the source of thier data as well . . . were the numbers truly as bad as the quoted paragraph suggest, I'd think we'd be building our airplanes to a newly minted FAR governing consumer grade aviation . . . Bob . . . //// (o o) ===========o00o=(_)=o00o========= < Independence Kansas: the > < Jurassic Park of aviation. > < Your source for brand new > < 40 year old airplanes. > ================================= http://www.aeroelectric.com From: "Nat Puffer" Subject: COZY: Accident rate Date: Tue, 11 May 1999 09:02:13 -0500 Builders, Robert Nuckolls posted a message questioning whether the accident rate for home-builts was any different than for factory builts. At a dinner meeting we went to at Oshkosh hosted by the insurance industry, I was told privately that the accident rate for Cozys was one-half that of Cessnas. Keep up the good work, guys. You deserve the credit! Nat From: alwick@juno.com Date: Wed, 16 Jun 1999 22:12:02 -0700 Subject: COZY: Re:fuel contamination ...was CRASH Wayne, thanks for sharing crash info. Over the years I've heard of many canards which have suffered from contamination. I discovered when building my plane that I caused the problem when I used vacuum to remove debris. After cutting the hole for my fuel cap, I went to vacuum tank interior. Vacuum caused contaminants to spread to far corners of tank interior instead of going into canister. This occured because the vacuum hose causes air to rush into tank, thus moving contaminants away from nozzle. You look into tank and it looks clean as a whistle....until you look to corners of tank. I will use small diam vacuum hose taped to end of nozzle when I repeat this process on my other strake. The small diam hose reduces the qty displaced air and prevents the tornado that occurred. Just wanted to warn everyone. This is a very very common failure mode we all need to heed. FWIW, I also have dual fuel pumps, dual outlet filters, independant inlets. Thanks again -al On Wed, 16 Jun 1999 20:56:23 -0700 Wayne Lanza writes: > Here's another lesson for us all - the fuel filter had about 60 hours of time > on it, so did the airframe. OK guys what seems to accumulate in our tanks > before we put fuel in them? You guessed it - dust, crap, junk, chunks and > all other forms of stuff that goes CLOG! Velocity recommends that the fuel > filter be changed out on a new airplane after the first 8-10 hours, sounds > reasonable to me. -al wick Canopy Latch System guy. Artificial intelligence in Cockpit Cozy sn 389 driven by stock Subaru 2.5 ltr.95% complete. ___________________________________________________________________ Get the Internet just the way you want it. Free software, free e-mail, and free Internet access for a month! Try Juno Web: http://dl.www.juno.com/dynoget/tagj. From: "Nat Puffer" Subject: COZY: Accidents Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 14:10:23 -0600 Dear builders, During WWII, when I went through flight training in the Navy, I thought, "I am flying an airplane that someone else built, and airplane that someone else maintains, I am flying it the way I was taught, and each flight that I make is because I was told to, so if anything goes wrong, it isn't my fault." But now I am flying an airplane that I built, with an engine that I installed, and an airplane that I maintain, and it is my decision every time I fly, so no matter what happens, it is my responsibility. I can't blame anybody else. Nat Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 09:16:28 -0600 From: David Domeier Subject: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death The silence on these 2 forums regarding a couple recent canard accidents indicates we don't much like to talk about dying in our airplanes. That's understandable, it isn't pleasant and there's much grief among close friends and family of the guys no longer here. But maybe we should talk about it. Maybe we should talk about the risk of flight more than we do and perhaps the accident rate would not be so predicable. It isn't just here with us in the canards, it's an aviation problem across the spectrum of small airplanes. Those of you who read the NTSB monthly incident/accident reports know of what I speak. Flight is a calculated risk but many of the risk factors are manageable. There is an element of bad luck also, but some of that is self induced. Every flight has it's own calculated risk. First flights in experimental airplanes have a high risk factor, but it isn't as high as it was before the tech advisor policy came into being. I think the accident rate is down to less than 1% whereas at one time it was around 10%. Pilots who feel the need to explore the corners of an airplane's envelope on a regular basis incur a risk factor not acceptable to the next guy. Low altitude sorties always raise the risk meter. Perhaps the number one item that could put a dent in the accident rate is a habit of assessment of risk every time we fly. The reality of what we contemplate doing needs to be thought about and an appreciation of the risk involved acknowledged. We do, directly or indirectly, accept the risk of flight because we love so much doing it. But sometimes we become so obsessed and distracted with the enjoyment of flight, or the personal status that a particular "skill" brings us, we lose touch with the reality of the risk of what's going on. Yes, we are all human and have varying degrees of ego to maintain. There is and always has been an intangible pecking order among pilots and it sometimes gets us into trouble. It is a problem with experienced pilots more than with guys who haven't had the chance to do this or that. The truth is,a pilot, whether he be a student in a 152 or a seasoned retired airline captain, is a "good" pilot only if he knows and respects his limits and those of his airplane. When we don't, we find ourselves outside our personal envelope. That is why some of this unpleasant stuff happens to very good pilots. I keep reminding myself, none of us are invincible. The laws of nature prevail. If I may quote from an old aviation poem "Aviation in itself is not inherently dangerous. But to a even greater degree than the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity, or neglect." dd From: Roy Grossinger Subject: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 09:13:55 -0800 For those that do not know where the NTSB site is, try http:///www.ntsb.gov Follow the aviation link and then you can review the nice web site they have. There is a search engine on the site and for several dollars a clearing house will mail you the actual report with pictures. I ordered the info packet on the Fl crash a while ago. I was interested in the failure modes of the restraint systems: front seats had 2 fatal, back seats had 2 survive. Nat made a recommendation based on my analysis last year. If anyone is interested I can dig up and post a summary for peer review. I still need to convince a few loved ones that the airplane is safe and being an engineer I like to back up my statements with numbers and statistics. Below are the NTSB accident reports I believe the first message was referring to. My own 2 cents worth, I don't think we builders stick our heads in the sand concerning aviation accidents involving in some cases our friends being injuring or dying. However, I think we tend to not like to openly discuss or guess to another's demise. I think John Denver's final flight is the one big exception of this. (good old media hype) :-( Roy NTSB Identification: IAD00FA003 Accident occurred NOV-01-99 at REMINGTON, VA Aircraft: Coughlin LONG-EZ, registration: N743TC Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. On November 1, 1999, at 1530 eastern standard time, a homebuilt Long-EZ, N743TC, was destroyed during a collision with trees and terrain while maneuvering over the Rappahannock River, Remington, Virginia. The airplane was consumed by post-crash fire. The certificated airline transport (ATP) rated passenger was seriously injured, and the ATP rated pilot died as a result of his injuries on November 3, 1999. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed for the personal flight that originated at the Culpeper Regional Airport (CJR), approximately 1515. No flight plan was filed for the flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. In telephone interviews, two witnesses who were fishing in the Rappahannock River at the time of the accident described seeing the accident airplane earlier in the day and at the time of the accident. Both witnesses described the airplane's flight path from east to west over their heads and then returning from the south over the river. The first witness said: "They flew over us. They were up fairly high heading [west]. They circled around and when they came back over the river he was making an extreme hard left to go back [west] and when I saw him, I could see the underbelly. The wings were at about a 60 or 70 degree angle and it sort of fluttered a little bit. "It looked like he was gonna make it but he hit the very, very, top of the trees. He just kept clipping off the tops. They were really big tall trees. There was no explosion, just a big 'woof' and a black cloud of smoke." When questioned about the sound of the airplane's engine, the witness said: "The engine sounded fine. I commented to my son how good it sounded. The plane sounded outstanding. Good running, real smooth running machine." The second witness provided a telephone interview, a written statement, and a diagram of the airplane's flight path. He said the airplane crossed over head from east to west and turned left over the woods on the west side of the river. The witness stated the airplane continued in a left turn and reappeared over the river, heading north towards his position. He said: "He banked down left into the river channel and never came out of his bank. He was flying about 200 to 250 feet then he banked it down into the river like the biplanes do. It was something around a 45-degree bank. Halfway between 90 degrees and zero. It was a fairly aggressive bank. I don't know where he lost control, whether it was over the trees or over the channel. He appeared to be back under control before he hit the trees; he just couldn't get the nose up. When he dove into the river, I didn't think anything of it. But he just didn't pull out. The pilot said, 'I don't understand. I just couldn't get it out of my bank." When questioned about the sound of the airplane's engine, the second witness said: "I didn't notice any unusual sounds. If there was smoke, or a sputter, or a stall, I think I would have recognized it." The wreckage was examined at the site on November 2, 1999, and all major components were accounted for at the scene. The wreckage path was oriented 210 degrees and measured approximately 460 feet from the initial point of tree contact to the main wreckage. The wreckage path was divided into one-foot increments called wreckage points (WP). The first tree contact (WP zero) was 60 feet west of the river's edge, approximately 45 feet above the ground. Structural foam, aircraft skin, and composite propeller fragments were scattered along the wreckage path from WP 160 to the main wreckage. The left rudder and the left winglet were at WP 220 and 235 respectively. Several angular cut branches were found along the wreckage path. The main wreckage came to rest upright, oriented 320 degrees, and was consumed by post-crash fire. An elliptical burn scar, approximately 90 feet long and 30 feet wide, surrounded the main wreckage. Trees inside the scar were burned to heights approximately 40 feet above the ground. The airframe, instruments, gauges, and controls were destroyed by fire. Power control cable continuity was established from the cockpit to the engine. Routing of flight control cables, push-pull tubes, and bellcranks was determined from the cockpit to the flight control surfaces. Control continuity could not be determined. Excessive deformation, melting, and complete destruction of components by fire was noted throughout the flight control system. The engine was removed from the site and examined in a maintenance garage in Remington, Virginia, on November 2, 1999. The engine and its associated components were extensively damaged by fire. Impact and fire destroyed the accessory case. The composite propeller blades were fragmented and fire damaged. Impact and fire destroyed the oil sump and carburetor. The fragmented, melted accessory case and its associated components were removed from the back of engine to facilitate rotation of the internal components. The spark plugs were intact and the electrodes were tan and gray in color. The cylinders, pistons, and valves were examined by borescope. These components displayed uniform wear and no anomalies. The engine was rotated by hand and continuity was established throughout the powertrain and valvetrain. Compression was confirmed using the thumb method. Examination of fuel records revealed that N743TC was serviced with 18.5 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel prior to the accident flight. The pilot's logbook and the airplane's maintenance records were not recovered. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) first class medical certificate was issued July 13, 1999. The pilot reported 3,000 hours of flight experience on that date. The passenger's most recent FAA first class medical certificate was issued May 12, 1999. The pilot reported 2,400 hours of flight experience on that date. Weather reported at Manassas Regional Airport, 20 miles northeast of CJR, was clear skies with winds from 130 degrees at 9 knots. NTSB Identification: NYC99LA208 Accident occurred AUG-21-99 at SCOTT, OH Aircraft: Kolb MARK III, registration: N6268A Injuries: 2 Fatal. This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. On August 21, 1999, about 1940 Eastern Daylight Time, a homebuilt Kolb Mark III, N6268A, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain near Scott, Ohio. The certificated private pilot and passenger were fatally injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed and no flight plan was filed for the local flight conducted under 14 CFR Part 91. According to witnesses, the pilot had departed from an airstrip located on his property, heading in a southerly direction. The airplane climbed to about 200 feet above the ground, then leveled off. About 3 minutes later, the engine noise began to decrease, "like he was throttling back." The airplane began a left turn, and disappeared from view. The witness then heard the sound of "plastic tearing, and breaking of corn stalks." A second witness, who noticed the airplane after it passed overhead, stated that the airplane made a "weird sound" and descended nose first toward the ground. A resident, located about 1/2 mile southwest of the wreckage, found a part of the airplane in a bean field, and turned it over to the local authorities. A Federal Aviation Administration Inspector later identified the part as a gap seal. The gap seal was an airfoil shaped piece of plexi-glass, used to fill the gap left in-between the wings when they are assembled. The wreckage was retained for further examination. -----Original Message----- From: James Russell [mailto:fshort@flash.net] Sent: Friday, November 12, 1999 6:55 AM To: cozy_builders@canard.com Subject: Re: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death > The silence on these 2 forums regarding a couple recent canard >accidents indicates we don't much like to talk about dying in our >airplanes. That's understandable, it isn't pleasant and there's much >grief among close friends and family of the guys no longer here. Yes, denial isn't just a river in Egypt... From: Militch@aol.com Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 15:41:14 EST Subject: Re: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death In a message dated 11/12/99 3:16:49 PM, david010@earthlink.net wrote: > I keep reminding myself, none of us are invincible. The laws of >nature prevail. If I may quote from an old aviation poem "Aviation in >itself is not inherently dangerous. But to a even greater degree than >the sea, it is terribly unforgiving of any carelessness, incapacity, or >neglect." This is equally true of riding motorcycles, which I also do. Anything that falls down when you screw up or when the ambient conditions are not as expected has a high probability of hurting you. When I ride my bike, I am constantly aware of my "out" if something goes wrong. If I can't identify one, I either slow down, or carry on with the understanding that it's great fun, but I might really, really regret it in about another 10 seconds. You cannot eliminate risk in life, and you shouldn't want to. That's no better than just staying in bed. What you can and should do is manage the risks sensibly. I ride fast, but I do it with leathers, body armor and a good helmet and gloves. I guess the discussions on this group about redundancy options, alternative building approaches, etc. fall in the same category - risk management. You just shouldn't stop thinking about it once the plane is built, and I doubt that many of us intend to. The crash the other day appears, from the preliminary report, to have been caused by a low-altitude stall due to high g loading. This is kind of like coming into a tight curve too fast and losing the front tire. Been there, done that. It hurt a lot, but I was fortunate enough to survive, and won't do it again. I also intend to remember this incident and not do the same once my plane is flying. Regards Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 16:09:36 -0500 From: Jim Sower Subject: Re: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death I flew tactical jets for nearly 12 years. Not counting two combat tours, I 'buried' a friend or acquaintance on the average of every month or two for upwards of ten years. Some had vertigo, some were drunk or fatigued, some were flat-hatting or otherwise being really stupid, some just got in over their head (training and/or skill wise), some we just never found out. Some of these guys were better aviators than I was and I couldn't figure out why them and not me. Some were not as good so it seemed obvious why them and not me. Some were pretty much just like me. We were always intensely interested in learning what happened. I tried to incorporate ways to prevent stuff that happened to them into my habit pattern(s) so perhaps it wouldn't happen to me. Occasionally that worked. Mostly, I made a deliberate decision to do stuff that I knew better. Nearly ALL of the guys I knew did stuff they knew better either more or less often than I did. The rest lied. Mostly we all survived. Occasionally one of us did not. For all of my studying, I was not able to see any rhyme or reason for how stuff turned out ~ and I fancy myself a reasonably intelligent, insightful, well educated guy. I've discovered that People are going to die. Without my approval. Typically at times and places and under circumstances that make me pretty uncomfortable. It has happened (a lot) and it will keep happening. I've spent way too many afternoons with a plastic bag and a butter knife policing up a friend of mine off the trees and rocks to get all hysterical when it happens again. Because it always will. Am I going to propose all manner of regulations on testing and/or training? HELL NO! Am I going to weigh my airplane down with all manner of preposterous technology to deal with this or that non-issue? HELL NO! I mean to deal with the cause of about 80% of all GA accidents and maybe 95% of fatalities ~ I'm going to keep trying to discipline MYSELF to stop making decisions that I know to be stupid and/or dangerous. Am I going to honor your decisions regarding how you behave in your very own airplane? YOU BET!! Will I get all pushed out of shape if you end up buying the farm as the result of YOUR decisions? I don't think so. I will bless you and wish you well in your further travels and thank you for reminding me that I need to be less cocky in my own decisions (if I TRULY mean to stay out of trouble). Another thing I have come to believe is that as a culture, we have some weird and even bizarre attitudes toward death. For openers, we take it waaaayyyy too seriously. Like we seem to regard it as some sort of defeat ~ an affront to our technology ~ an abomination that with proper planning and management could (and should) be avoided altogether ~ like if I play my cards just right, I'll be the guy to get out of this place alive. Its NUTS!! Guy gets killed driving to work, doing everything right and we don't turn a hair. His cousin gets killed flat-hatting in his homebuilt airplane and suddenly it's some kind of catastrophe. Its nuts. Why is this? We get all upset over a half dozen people getting done in by a postal employee or something six states away, but we bomb and bury alive whole populations or Iraquis or Kosivars or whatever and nobody turns a hair. Why is this? My far-too-lengthy .02 Jim S. James Russell wrote: > > The silence on these 2 forums regarding a couple recent canard > >accidents indicates we don't much like to talk about dying in our > >airplanes. That's understandable, it isn't pleasant and there's much > >grief among close friends and family of the guys no longer here. > > Yes, denial isn't just a river in Egypt... From: cdenk@ix.netcom.com Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 16:41:45 -0500 (EST) Subject: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death The Kolb aircraft is not even close to the design of the Ez family. It is a much lighter, aluminum and fabric construction with a fiberglass nose fairing. The engine is usually one of the smaller Rotac's. Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 16:09:10 -0600 From: "Tom Brusehaver" Subject: Re: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death > The crash the other day appears, from the preliminary report, to have been > caused by a low-altitude stall due to high g loading. Again, the pilot didn't leave an out. Also he hit tops of trees, cause/effect? Been reviewing the CP's over the past month or so, and Burt over and over reminds us that the saftey of the plane isn't in question. Most of the crashes are due to lot altitude stuff (CFIT, airbatics), or engine failure. The fact this one had a fire scares me a little. Burt was pretty proud of the fact there were virtually no fires in crashes of the Vari-Eze. There is probably no good explaination of why these planes do or don't have a fire in a crash, but I would hope some how someone could explain that. I guess I could see mostly full fuel, and high speed would be contributing factors (f=MA). If you want to talk about it. Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 18:30:08 -0500 From: "Marc J. Zeitlin" Subject: COZY: John Graves' Accident Richard Riley of Renaissance Composites (makers of the Berkut) asked me to send this to the COZY list: As many of you know, John Graves was killed last week in the crash of his Long EZ in Virginia. There are some early indications that aileron lockup may have been a contributing factor. Please understand, these are very preliminary suggestions of a cause, not conclusive results of an investigation. At Renaissance we have recently come across two aileron lockup situations, both involving Vari-ezes. The first was caused by inadequate clearance between the counterweight, and the lower leading edge of the aileron, and the lower trailing edge of the aileron well. The second was caused by a hinge pin migrating out of it's hinge and departing. In both cases the pilots were able to recover and land safely. We would like to take this opportunity to urge all canard owners to inspect their airplanes for these two conditions, and for anything else that might cause aileron lock. At the same time, check the bolts, rod ends and bearings throughout your control system. Certainly these things should be part of your condition inspection, and control system play should be part of your preflight, but please give them one extra check for safety's sake. Thank you. Richard Riley Renaissance Composites From: "norm doty" Subject: COZY: accidents Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1999 09:20:14 -0500 regrettably this wont prevent some one else's demise, I've been building for about 6 yrs now. some of the things I've been watching others do terrifies me, and when I've brought it to their attention (politely) and explain why it's a problem I'm told I'm wrong and they are right. and after a few more visits they make it plain that they don't want me around anymore. so I now keep my advice to myself and just watch them go out and sometimes fly and sometimes die. what worries me the most is the bad construction or wiring or substitution of components, these errors only compound them selves one error upon another. the really sad part is it probably won't kill the builder but the planes second or third owner. my $ 0.02 norm & monda cozy IV #202 (ford v-6 powered) (see I didn't listen either) From: cdenk@ix.netcom.com Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1999 12:14:58 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: COZY: accidents Was said Accepting good critizism, in particular when backed up with valid information is important to everyone's safety, and doesn't stop at aviation, but everything everyone does. Though the person offering the advice also should remain a gentleman or lady, if the advice isn't followed. But it reasonable that the advice should be considered and then discarded, modified, or used as offered. Modern thinking includes brainstorming, where many ideas are quickly put on the table, then in discussion (could be with self) the list is reduced. Ohio State (and most other states) Professional Engineering code of ethics (State Law) requires that a registered engineer, if aware of an unsafe condition, (generally in his area of expertice), and if usual methods of correction fail, he MUST notify the appropriate authorities. This amounts to "Whistle Blowing". This is a tough call, and I know I probably missed a promotion or 2 due to taking stands on safety issues, but in the long run the boss patted on back. Back to aviation, if something is major safety, could try to enlist help of others to impress the person. But there are times one must just back away and turn the other way. From: "DL Davis" Subject: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death Date: Fri, 12 Nov 1999 20:19:38 -0500 At least one reason for the silence in the other forum is that the moderator is censoring all email which contains speculation about the cause of the Long EZ accident. I wrote a message concerning the John Graves Long EZ accident, which made it through the moderator, after about 50% of the message was edited out. I then wrote to the moderator and politely suggested it was counterproductive to not allow us to talk about the potential causes of fatal accidents in our airplanes. I have included the full text of my original message below. If you are offended by "speculation", hit the delete button now. Dewey Davis Original Message: > -----Original Message----- > From: owner-canard-aviators@betaweb.com > [mailto:owner-canard-aviators@betaweb.com]On Behalf Of Fink, Allen L > Sent: Tuesday, November 09, 1999 10:54 PM > To: 'Canard Aviators' > Cc: Fink, Allen L > Subject: [c-a] LESSONS LEARNED FROM JOHN GRAVES ACCIDENT > > > I suspect that a beautiful day in Virginia, a beautiful piece of > countryside, two ATP's in a seasoned LEZ with the engine purring led > John to an "edge of the envelope condition" that exposed a "unique > characteristic" in that particular aircraft. I have also been thinking a lot about this accident too. It bothered me more than most, for some of the same reasons you mentioned (e.g., John was an excellent pilot, and there was nothing obviously wrong with the airplane). But, I wouldn't assume that it was a "quirk" in the airplane that went undiscovered. I rode in the back of John's Long EZ a couple of weeks before the accident. The control system seemed fine to me as I put the airplane through several steep turns and so forth. We actually talked about the control system that day. He was unsatisfied with the slop in it (it did have more than most EZs), but it was smooth and the airplane was very responsive. He was considering some new bearings in the control system. Also, John did frequently fly the airplane in some stressful maneuvers (e.g., loops). It seems very unlikely to me that the airplane had some kind of latent quirk that only showed up as he pushed the envelope on the day of the accident. I'll concede that it is possible, but I believe it is far more likely that something different went wrong on that day. My own speculation, is that one of three things happened. 1) the control system locked because of aileron binding against the wing under high G. 2) The control system locked because of something falling from the back seat into the stick hole. 3) The rear seat passenger's leg interfered with the range of stick motion. I once test flew another builder's airplane that had the problem #1 above. He had flown it for only a few hours and he had not noticed it. I must have put it through a little more G loading than he had ever done, because I was able to get the stick to lock in a turn. Fortunately it didn't stay locked when I released elevator pressure. When I got it back to the ground, we lifted the airplane by the winglet and duplicated the problem there. All it needed was a little more clearance between the aileron and wing on that side. But I don't think this could be John's problem because he had thoroughly wrung out the airplane under high G, many times before. The second problem has been know to happen due to loose seat belts and other paraphernalia from the back seat falling through the hole in the armrest for the rear stick. I don't think this one is very likely either, because John had a rear seat passenger, so the seat belt was in use, and there was no baggage in the rear seat. The third problem is the one I think is most likely, and this is why I think so. Imagine this scenario. They are flying over the Rappahanock river and decide the go low for a better view. They are flying low and following the twists and turns of the river below. The rear seat passenger naturally tenses up, and swells up as they get closer to the ground, as passengers tend to do under these situations. A steep turn is made to the right to follow a bend in the river, but during the roll back left to neutral, the passenger's leg is interfering with the rear stick. At that speed and altitude, there isn't even time to complain about it and John is in big trouble with the trees surrounding the river. When I rode in the back of John's Long EZ, I had to consciously move my knees to the left to keep his range of control free. We talked about it as he prepared for takeoff. I don't know if there was anything unusual about his airplane but there seemed to be less room than I remember in other Long EZs. Did his retractable mains mod result in any changes for the rear seat passenger? In any case, I offer this speculation because I don't think the NTSB will ever be able to determine the cause of the accident if it is either problem 2 or 3 above, and maybe not 1 either. I only knew John a short time, but I certainly agree he was a great guy to be around, and he was a very good pilot. I don't really think there was a "unique characteristic" lurking in the airplane though. This seems more like a case of interference in the control system that could have a very simple cause. Unfortunately, where he was flying left no margin for error. Dewey Davis From: cdenk@ix.netcom.com Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1999 08:35:26 -0500 (EST) Subject: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death Was said I do not believe this is the moderator's authority to censor this information! 1: I wasn't even aware this happened, and likely would have been interested in a possible friend's demise 2: A healthly discussion of circumstances, even though speculation (and noted as such) may prevent someone elses demise. From: "JStricker" Subject: Re: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1999 11:39:27 -0600 Seems like we've been here before, but I'll jump on it again because I think it's something that's important. IMHO, this is MARC'S LIST. Period. I don't ever remember him censoring anything, but he has on occasion jumped in and said "enough was enough" on the Aerocad/Cozy issue. That's certainly his prerogative. And if Marc says "We're not talking about this on the Cozy list anymore" then that, as they say, is that as far as I'm concerned. He can, whenever he feels like it, stop the list if he wants to. I'm grateful that he doesn't and that it is administered as fairly and openly as it is. Thanks Marc. If someone doesn't like the way it's run, they can drop off and/or start their own. I'm sure with Marc's blessing. If they want to stay here, they do what the list owner wants them to. If you come to my house, you abide by the rules of my house. If you don't want to, the road is just right outside and don't let the door hit you in the butt on the way out. The censorship referred to was on the canard aviators list and it is clearly moderated. Some lists and newsgroups are moderated just by not allowing items to be posted, others are done by, yes, censorship. I almost never post (but I subscribe and read) the c-a list because I don't like the idea of them cutting pieces out of a post. A post should either appear completely or they just don't allow it to be sent, IMHO. But there is a lot of good info on the list, so I read it. That said though, the c-a list is someone else's house, and THEY can run their list however they want. If someone doesn't like the way they run it, start your own. But I, for one, get tired of hearing people say "YOU CAN'T DO THAT!!" and whining about it. It's their house, and they can do what they want in it. Don't like it, leave. JMHO John Stricker jstricke@russellks.net "I didn't spend all these years getting to the top of the food chain just to be a vegetarian" ----- Original Message ----- From: To: ; Sent: Saturday, November 13, 1999 7:35 AM Subject: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death > Was said > > I do not believe this is the moderator's authority to censor this information! > > 1: I wasn't even aware this happened, and likely would have been interested in a possible friend's demise > 2: A healthly discussion of circumstances, even though speculation (and noted as such) may prevent someone elses demise. > Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1999 13:06:01 -0500 From: "Marc J. Zeitlin" Subject: Fwd: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death Carl Denk wrote: >Was said > >I do not believe this is the moderator's authority to censor this information! Let's just make one thing clear - THERE ARE TWO MAILING LISTS BEING DISCUSSED HERE! The first one (that Dewey was referring to regarding moderator omissions) is the "Canard Aviator's" mailing list. The second one is this one - the COZY mailing list. The Canard Aviators list is a moderated list, meaning that someone vets each message and decides whether it gets through, and sometimes edits them (as was apparently done to Dewey's list). Let me make it absolutely clear that THERE IS NOTHING WRONG WITH DOING THAT. It's neither illegal, immoral, or unnatural. It's just another form of list, and the canard aviators list makes it absolutely clear when you join that that's how it works. The list belongs to the people that run it, and they can do as they like. They like to minimize speculation, nastiness, and controversy, and that is their right. However, I run this list differently, and have no problem with Dewey's message, or anyone's response to it. I don't "vet" messages, I don't edit messages, and I don't see them before anyone else does. >1: I wasn't even aware this happened, and likely would have been interested >in a possible friend's demise >2: A healthly discussion of circumstances, even though speculation (and >noted as such) may prevent someone elses demise. I agree, which is why there is NO MODERATION of the COZY list. You send it, everyone sees it, no matter what. Hope this clears up some possible confusion. -- Marc J. Zeitlin mailto:marcz@ultranet.com http://www.ultranet.com/~marcz/ Date: Sat, 13 Nov 1999 15:50:10 -0500 From: James Russell Subject: Re: Fwd: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death > >I agree, which is why there is NO MODERATION of the COZY list. You send >it, everyone sees it, no matter what. > >Hope this clears up some possible confusion. > Hi Marc; I'm glad you said that - especially about possible safety-of-flight issues.... But, bad judgement, pushing weather, and running out of gas still kill most people. We just had a Warrior dead-stick into a field 1 mile from the airport due to no gas - the pilot's comments to the cameras: " I don't know why we ran out - we always made it before."! Regards, James From: Jim Hocut Subject: RE: COZY: Aviators-Life and Death Date: Sun, 14 Nov 1999 01:42:23 -0500 > More pilots are killed on the way to and from the airport than > flying --- Unfortunately that's just not true in the case of general aviation. Studies by the NTSB and AOPA's Air Safety Foundation have shown general aviation to be several times riskier than driving an auto. Most general aviation accidents, however, are preventable by good planning, using good judgement, taking care of your equipment, and not showing off. As Jesse Ventura said, "you can't legislate stupidity". Jim Hocut jhocut@mindspring.com Date: Wed, 01 Dec 1999 10:14:00 -0600 From: David Domeier Subject: COZY: Dumb,Dumber.... I wasn't going to tell anyone about this experience except my wife, but after thinking about it over night decided there's something to be learned and it should be shared with other canard aviators and builders. I was distracted by a Cessna 150 during an approach yesterday and landed with the nose gear up and locked. Yes, the gear warning system was working. But the audio warning was not heard due to a noise cancel headset and I missed the red light. I also forgot a landing check list with just 3 items on it. So much for attention span.....the Cessna did clear the runway in time. Lesson learned - install a warning device with an audio input to the interphone system. ACS has 'em on page 417. I'll be ordering one today. Also, when distracted by ANYTHING, a red flag should go up with a self installed head tape that says, "What am I forgetting!" This is especially so when flying around alone without a wife or co-pilot to keep one out of trouble. Damage to the airplane was almost a non event. The snubber, which was St. Louis Blues hockey puck, is gone as is some paint, primer and fill. The snubber will be replaced with something a bit more firm and hopefully not used again. It's been said "there are those who have and those who will" and after some 400 landings in a LEZ and the Cozy, I move from the later to the former. Say it ain't so, but it is. dd From: "John Slade" Subject: Re: COZY: Dumb,Dumber.... Date: Sun, 28 Nov 1999 20:48:26 -0500 Was said >If you ever run out of runway, retracting the nose gear will help you >stop in a hurry with hardly any damage to the airplane. This is a safety >feature! Also, I hear it on good authority [Steve Wright] that you can raise the electric nose lift gear while sliding along on your "puck". Think of the gear as a REALLY powerful adjustable braking device. Better that a chute! Also handy if you want to dispense with the runway and land right on the ramp. Seriously though - this might be real useful if you have to land in a parking lot or on a road someday. John Slade PS - Thanks, David, for sharing. Many would have kept quiet. From: alwick@juno.com Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 11:36:34 -0800 Subject: Re: COZY: Dumb,Dumber.... On Wed, 01 Dec 1999 10:14:00 -0600 David Domeier writes: > I was distracted by a Cessna 150 during an approach yesterday and > landed with the nose gear up and locked. The sad thing is that others are going to read of your experience and just blow it off. Or arrive at the conclusion that visual and audio warnings don't work. It's the details of your warning sys that makes the difference. Visual warnings can't be subtle. They must be profound. Audio warnings must be meaningful. If you hear audio only once in your flying career, that's a good sys. If it goes off all the time, you'll be more likely to tune out. It's the DETAILS of the sys. Any of us who conclude "I must be more attentive", are setting themselves up for failure. Unfortunately, the failures are so infrequent that we don't realize that the system in inadequate. So we don't learn the DETAILS. Sorry for preaching, but this happens to be my area of expertise. I've probably done more experimenting with solutions to these types of problems than most. Sure appreciate your sharing Dave. Hopefully we all recognize that this lesson you experienced also applies to flight critical systems. -al wick Now wiring in my limit switches and other sensors. Man this is fun! ___________________________________________________________________ Get the Internet just the way you want it. Free software, free e-mail, and free Internet access for a month! Try Juno Web: http://dl.www.juno.com/dynoget/tagj. From: cdenk@ix.netcom.com Date: Wed, 1 Dec 1999 17:24:34 -0500 (EST) Subject: Re: COZY: Dumb,Dumber.... Was said